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INTRODUCTION 
Transuranic solid waste that has been generated as a 
result of the production of nuclear material for the United 
States defense program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) 
has been stored in more than 30,000 55-gallon drums and 
various size carbon steel boxes since 1953. Nearly two 
thirds of those containers have been processed and 
shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.  Among the 
containers assayed so far, the results indicate several 
drums with fissile inventories significantly higher (600 – 
1000 grams 239Pu) than their original assigned values. 
While part of this discrepancy can be attributed to the past 
limited assay capabilities, human errors are believed to be 
the primary contributor. 
 
 This paper summarizes an assessment of the 
probability of occurrence of a criticality accident during 
handling of the remaining transuranic waste containers at 
SRS. 
 
DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
Historically, plutonium was a valuable commodity 
and the goal was to minimize the amount sent to waste.  
In addition to the financial incentive to minimize 
plutonium waste, programs such as nuclear material 
accountability, ALARA, and the criticality safety program 
at the generator facilities helped to prevent excessive 
amounts of fissile material in waste.  Much of the recent 
criticality safety analyses have focused on a period of 
time when acceptance criteria and assay systems have 
improved, post 1985.  Prior to 1985, programs were 
different and the assay capabilities were limited. Since 
their utilization, the newer assay systems have identified 
some drums with higher fissile mass than their original 
assay values.  Human errors are thought to be the primary 
contributor in generating waste containers with high 
fissile mass content. 
 
Conservative subcritical mass limits were determined 
to preclude an accidental criticality during generation and 
storage of waste containers. Furthermore, criticality safety 
margins were included in operating procedures at the 
generator facilities to ensure the subcritical mass limits 
were not violated. Subcritical mass limits were 
established based on a maximum subcritical mass where 
other parameters such as moderation, fissile material 
concentration, configuration, and neutron absorber 
content were at their optimum conditions for reactivity.  
Such analyses were considered deterministic in that the 
optimum event conditions were assumed to be present 
without any consideration for the probability of 
occurrence of such events. 
 
This probabilistic assessment methodology, in 
contrast, is based on the probability of the occurrence of 
such conditions estimated accounting for historical data, 
waste packaging practices, and radiography of waste 
container contents. 
 
The waste containers have been exposed to various 
configurations and conditions since being packaged, 
including interaction with other fissile material and 
reflection from drums, forklifts, personnel, etc. Some 
waste drums were buried underground and some were 
exposed to rain water during storage.  The containers have 
remained subcritical because not all the conditions, such 
as moderation, fissile material concentration, 
configuration, and neutron absorber content, are in the 
ranges required to support a critical configuration. 
 
A criticality involving waste containers can occur 
only if several independent events involving sufficient 
fissile mass, sufficient moderation, optimum 
concentration and configuration occur simultaneously. 
The probability of the criticality is determined by 
estimating the individual event probabilities.  It is 
considered much more likely for a criticality to occur in a 
single high fissile content container than due to 
interaction among two or more high fissile content 
containers due to the improbability of adjacent containers 
having large fissile inventories.  As such, this study 
focuses on the probability of a criticality in a container, 
which is given by: 
  
 ( ) ( )Ucrit LP P E m f m dm= ∫                  (1) 
 
where P(E|m) is the probability of criticality due to event 
probabilities in a range to support a criticality for a system 
with a fissile mass m; f(m) is the probability density 
function for fissile mass, and f(m)dm is the probability of 
a container having a fissile mass between m and m + dm. 
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The integral limits range from the minimum critical 
mass to the maximum credible fissile mass. The minimum 
integral limit chosen for this assessment is one kilogram 
of 239Pu.  Although a criticality is possible with a lower 
fissile mass, the probabilities of the events necessary for 
the criticality are so low that inclusion in equation 1 is 
insignificant. It is noted that the probability of a criticality 
is not very sensitive to the upper fissile mass limit 
because of the rapid decrease in the probability of having 
a container with a large fissile mass. A credible but 
unlikely upper mass limit was assumed to be three 
kilograms 239Pu. 
 
The probability of having a drum with a specific 
fissile mass was estimated using the assay results of 500 
drums whose originally assigned inventory values were 
suspect.  These drums came from a period in the 1980s in 
which human errors are believed to be a major contributor 
in generating waste drums with high fissile mass content.  
The probability for having a particular fissile mass in a 
drum was determined using a log-normal distribution 
described by the probability density function (pdf) 
presented in equation 2 [1]. 
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where x is the natural logarithm of the fissile mass, µ is 
the mean of the natural logarithm of the fissile mass 
values, and σ is the standard deviation of the natural 
logarithm of the fissile mass values for the 500 suspect 
drums.   The cumulative distribution function (cdf) is then 
obtained by integrating equation 2 over the limits of the 
mass interval. 
 
From the assayed drum data, the probability of a 
drum containing a specific fissile mass was obtained by 
dividing the number of drums in a mass interval by the 
total number of drums assayed.  For the log-normal 
distribution, the probability for having a drum containing 
a specific fissile mass was obtained from the difference of 
the values of the cdf as shown in equation 3. 
 
              Probability | |U Lcdf cdf= −                    (3)       
where U and L are the upper and lower mass limits, 
respectively, of the fissile mass interval. The fissile mass 
probabilities are compared in Figure 1. 
 
The probability for enough moderator in a drum to 
support a criticality was estimated based on the 
radiography of the 500 suspect drums contents. The 
probability for optimum fissile material concentration was 
estimated based on the required height of a critical fissile 
pancake at the bottom of a drum divided by the total 
height of the drum. The probability for sufficiently low 
leakage geometry was estimated as a function of fissile 
mass in the drum.  A larger fissile mass provides more 
source neutrons to compensate for a higher neutron 
leakage geometry.  The probability of the neutron 
absorber content was estimated based on the historical 
operational data and waste packaging practices. 
                                             
Figure 1.  Comparison of Assay Results with Log-Normal 
Distribution Predictions 
 
The probability of a criticality in a drum having 
between 1 and 3 kg plutonium is the product of event 
probabilities and the fissile mass probability. Equation 1 
may be integrated using the trapezoidal rule to estimate 
the probability of criticality.  The conditional probability 
term, P(E|m), is the average of the product of the event 
probabilities at the end points of the mass intervals.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The probabilistic assessment study concluded that the 
probability of a criticality in a drum at the SRS solid 
waste management facility is acceptably low. 
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